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I. Introduction 
In May 2011 South Africa’s new corporate rescue procedure, known as “business rescue”, 
came into operation. The mechanism is contained in Chapter 6 of the Companies Act 2008 
(the SA Companies Act) and replaces the previous corporate rescue mechanism known as 
judicial management. While business rescue appears to have worked quite well since its 
inception eight years ago, there have been a number of court judgments that have been 
critical of the fact that many provisions of the new procedure have not been well drafted.2 One 
of these provisions, relating to the payment of unpaid remuneration of the business rescue 
practitioner (BRP) where a company’s business rescue procedure is converted to a liquidation, 
recently gave rise to litigation with the Courts focusing on the interpretation of the relevant 
statutory provisions. 
 The remuneration of insolvency practitioners is a contentious issue as much in the UK 
as in South Africa (and is indeed a bone of contention throughout the world). In February of 
this year the right honourable Frank Field MP, the chair of the UK House of Commons’ Work 
and Pensions Committee, commented on the £44.2 million to be paid in fees to Price 
Waterhouse Coopers in relation to one year’s Insolvency work on Carillion as “milking the cash 
cow”.3  
  
                                                          
† The appellant in this case, Mr Diener, who was appointed as the business rescue practitioner, sought leave from the 
Constitutional Court to appeal the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal. Although the Constitutional Court dismissed the 
application for leave to appeal (Diener N.O. v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Others [2018] ZACC 48), the Court 
did comment on some of the aspects covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal. Where appropriate, the judgment 
of the Constitutional Court in refusing leave to appeal will also be referred to in this note. 
 Dr Lézelle Jacobs is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Wolverhampton and a Research Associate at the University of the Free 
State, South Africa. ORCID ID: 0000-0001-8217-8467. Dr David Burdette is Senior Technical Research Officer at INSOL 
International, London, United Kingdom and an Extraordinary Professor at the Department of Mercantile Law, University of the Free 
State, South Africa. 
2 See, for example, para 18 of the case under discussion. 
3 The Times, 7 February 2019. Referring to the Insolvency practitioners’ fees he commented: “In this they are ably assisted by a 
merry little bank of advisors and auditors, conflicted at every turn and with every incentive to milk the cash cow dry.” 
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This note endeavours to comment on the South African Courts’ interpretation of provisions 
relating to the payment of remuneration to BRPs in the event that the business rescue 
procedure is superseded by liquidation.  
It might be noteworthy to mention the position in England and Wales where a former 
administrator’s remuneration and expenses are charged and payable out of property over 
which he or she had control immediately before cessation of the administration and are 
payable in priority to any security based on a floating charge.4 This arrangement also applies if 
the administration is converted to liquidation proceedings and in essence provides for a very 
high ranking ahead of most secured and unsecured creditors. 
 Before providing our analysis and commentary on the SA Court’s decision, it is worth 
mentioning that section 143(5) of the SA Companies Act envisages the BRP’s fees and 
disbursements being paid as a first priority before the payment of any other claims against 
the corporation, both pre-and post-commencement of the business rescue proceedings. In 
line with the possibility that a rescue attempt may not be successful and that the business 
rescue proceedings could be converted to liquidation proceedings, the legislature had the 
foresight to include a provision allowing for the preferential payments provided for by section 
135 to be retained in the event of a business rescue being converted to a liquidation (section 
135(5)). Although the manner in which this provision has been drafted creates some 
ambiguity and will be discussed in more detail below, in our view it is clear that the intention of 
the legislature was that the BRP should retain the preferential status afforded the BRP’s fees 
and disbursements under the business rescue procedure in the subsequent liquidation of the 
company, subject only to the priority afforded the costs of liquidation. 
II. Facts and background 
On 13 June 2012, the members of the business JD Bester Labour Brokers CC (the 
corporation) passed a resolution under section 129(1) of the SA Companies Act, voluntarily 
placing the corporation in business rescue. One Mr Diener was nominated as the BRP for the 
corporation under the enabling provisions of the Act. 
 On 14 June 2012, the corporation instructed a firm of attorneys to launch an urgent 
application against a secured creditor of the corporation who had a mortgage over the 
corporation’s immovable property, its only asset of any value, and which was about to be sold 
in execution. An order to this effect was granted on the same day. The attorneys later 
submitted their account for services rendered to the BRP, who went on to claim the expense 
as part of the expenses incurred in the business rescue proceedings. 
 During August 2012, the BRP came to the conclusion that the corporation could not be 
rescued and instructed the same firm of attorneys to bring an application under section 
141(2)(a) of the SA Companies Act, to convert the business rescue proceedings to liquidation 
proceedings. The order placing the corporation in liquidation was granted by the Court on 27 
August 2012 and the Master of the High Court subsequently appointed three joint liquidators.  
 The BRP duly provided the liquidators with an account for his outstanding fees, as well 
as the accounts submitted by the firm of attorneys for the work conducted by them on behalf 
of the BRP and the corporation.5 The joint liquidators could not agree on how the costs of the 
                                                          
4 Paras 70 and 99, Schedule B1, Insolvency Act 1986. 
5 It is worth mentioning that the firm of attorneys also proved a claim for the amounts owing to them as creditors in the 
liquidation. 
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BRP and the firm of attorneys should be dealt with in the liquidation and distribution account6 
and the matter was referred to the Master for a decision. The Master agreed with the views of 
one of the joint liquidators, that the BRP had failed to prove for his debt in the liquidation, so 
went unpaid, and that the attorneys ranked merely as unsecured creditors. The Master 
subsequently approved the liquidation and distribution account based on these views.7 
 Thereafter the BRP launched an application in the High Court to review and set aside 
the Master’s decision to approve the account submitted by the liquidators and sought an 
order whereby the Court could provide direction as to how the unpaid fees of the BRP and the 
expenses incurred by the attorneys during business rescue proceedings, should be dealt with 
in the account. The High Court dismissed the application, agreeing with the Master that fees 
and expenses incurred during business rescue, if not paid during business rescue 
proceedings, can only be paid as a priority claim from the free residue after the payment of 
costs of liquidation. 
 The matter was then brought to the South African Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA),8 
where the BRP contended that, in terms of the provisions of the SA Companies Act, business 
rescue practitioners’ claims for remuneration enjoy a “special and novel preference” which 
ranks them above creditors, whether secured or not.  
 In its judgment dismissing the BRP’s appeal, the SCA determined that the issues that 
needed to be dealt with were:9 a) the order of preference of the BRP’s claim for remuneration 
and expenses in the liquidation of the corporation; b) a determination of the date of liquidation 
where business rescue proceedings are converted to liquidation proceedings; and c) whether 
the BRP is required to prove his or her claim in terms of section 44 of the South African 
Insolvency Act 1936 (the SA Insolvency Act) and the effect of the BRP not having done so in 
this case.10 Each of these aspects will be dealt with separately below. 
III. The SCA issues 
a) Order of preference of the BRP’s claim 
The decision in this case hinged on an interpretation of two sections of the SA Companies Act, 
namely sections 135(3) and 143(5). The relevant part of section 135 reads as follows: 
                                                          
6 A liquidation and distribution account is an account of the administration of the estate by the liquidator and is submitted to the 
Master in terms of the liquidator’s statutory obligations. It needs to be understood that, unlike most other jurisdictions, under 
South African insolvency law secured creditors generally may not deal with the object of their security outside the insolvency 
process. All assets of the estate, whether held as security or not, form part of the insolvent estate and are accounted for by the 
liquidator. However, secured creditors are entitled to be paid from the proceeds of their security, subject only to certain prescribed 
costs first being paid from the proceeds of the security. These include the costs of maintaining, preserving and realising the 
property in question, as well as certain fees (such as the liquidator’s fees, a proportionate share of the Master’s fees, etc). The end 
result is that although assets subject to security are included in the estate, the proceeds are ringfenced for the secured creditors 
who hold the assets as security. All unsecured or unencumbered assets fall in the “free residue” of the estate and this is the 
general account from which all general expenses of the liquidation are paid. If there is any free residue left after payment of the 
liquidation costs, this is used to pay the preferential and unsecured creditors in the estate in a specified order of preference. 
7 The joint liquidator in question contended that the BRP had failed to prove a claim in terms of s 44 of the South African 
Insolvency Act and that the claim by the firm of attorneys was merely an unsecured claim against the estate. In regard to the 
payment of the BRP’s fees, it is worth noting that there were insufficient funds in the free residue of the estate with which  to pay 
the BRP’s outstanding fees as a priority claim after the costs of liquidation. In the Court of the first instance, the Court held that 
the outstanding fees of the BRP can be categorised as a priority or preferential claim, but can only be paid from the free residue of 
the estate after the payment of the liquidation costs.  
8 The South African Restructuring and Insolvency Association (SARIPA), the Banking Association of South Africa (BASA), the 
Independent Business Rescue Association of South Africa (IBRASA), and the Turnaround Management Association Southern 
Africa MPC (Turnaround Management) made submissions as amici curiae in the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
9 At para 15 of the judgment. 
10 There were two further questions the Court dealt with, relating to the fees charged by the attorneys, but these are unrelated to 
the question relating to the BRP’s fees and will not be addressed in this note. 
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“135 Post-commencement finance 
(1)  . . . 
(2)  . . . 
(3) After payment of the practitioner's remuneration and expenses referred to in 
section 143, and other claims arising out of the costs of the business rescue 
proceedings, all claims contemplated— 
(a)  in subsection (1) will be treated equally, but will have preference over— 
(i)  all claims contemplated in subsection (2), irrespective of 
whether or not they are secured; and 
(ii)  all unsecured claims against the company; or 
(b)  in subsection (2) will have preference in the order in which they were 
incurred over all unsecured claims against the company. 
(4) If business rescue proceedings are superseded by a liquidation order, the 
preference conferred in terms of this section will remain in force, except to the extent 
of any claims arising out of the costs of liquidation.”11 
The relevant part of section 143 reads as follows: 
“143 Remuneration of practitioner 
(1) . . . 
(2) . . . 
(3) . . . 
(4) . . . 
(5) To the extent that the practitioner's remuneration and expenses are not fully 
paid, the practitioner's claim for those amounts will rank in priority before the claims 
of all other secured and unsecured creditors.”12 
The BRP’s interpretation of the relevant provisions (in the context of the business rescue 
having been converted to liquidation) was that he enjoyed, after the costs of liquidation, a 
‘super-preference’ over all other creditors, whether secured or unsecured. The view of the BRP 
was based on an interpretation of section 143(5) of the SA Companies Act, which states that 
the BRP’s outstanding fees rank in priority before the claims of all other secured and 
unsecured creditors (in the context of a business rescue proceeding).  
 After going through the process of interpreting the relevant statutory provisions, the 
Court held that the provisions of sections 143(5) and 135(3) should be read together and 
confirmed the limited preferential nature of the claim of the BRP for outstanding fees once a 
business rescue proceeding has been converted to liquidation. The Court, therefore, 
confirmed the view of the Court a quo that the BRP’s fees are payable out of the free residue 
of the estate in liquidation, after the section 97 (liquidation) costs but before the payment of 
other preferential claims in terms of the SA Insolvency Act13 and that such fees are not 
amounts that can be paid out of the proceeds of assets of the secured creditors.  
 Having correctly stated that section 135 deals with post-commencement finance and 
section 143 with the rights of the BRP to remuneration, it is unclear why the Court then states 
that the two sections must be read together. If the two sections are unrelated, why should 
                                                          
11 Section 135 SA Companies Act. Emphasis added. 
12 Section 143(5) SA Companies Act. Emphasis added. 
13 Section 97 SA Insolvency Act 24 of 1936.  
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they be read together? In arriving at this conclusion, the Court states (at paragraph 43 of the 
judgment): 
“The reference to secured and unsecured creditors must, in my view, be understood to 
be a reference back to section 135: to those persons who have, or who have been 
deemed to have, provided the company with post-commencement finance, both 
secured and unsecured, and not to the company’s pre-business rescue creditors. 
Simply put, the preference operates within this limited context.” 
While an argument can certainly be made out that the (continued) preference (into liquidation) 
referred to in section 135(4) relates only to a preference the BRP may have in relation to the 
claims listed in that section, it does not make sense then to read section 143(5) together with 
section 135(4). Section 143(5) clearly states that the fees and expenses of a BRP rank in 
priority to the secured and unsecured claims and, despite the poor wording of section 135(4), 
the clear intention is that the preferential status of the BRP’s fees should remain in the event 
that the business rescue is converted to a liquidation.  
 The fact is, and the Court did not address this issue, the BRP’s fees and expenses do 
enjoy a priority over the claims of all creditors in the context of business rescue proceedings. 
Generally no distinction is made between secured and unsecured creditors (except in the case 
of post-commencement lenders in the context of section 135) in a business rescue and all 
creditors’ claims rank behind the fees and expenses of the BRP. This is quite clear from the 
wording of section 143(5). The contrary general statement by the Court (in paragraph 44) in 
this regard, is simply not accurate.14 It also needs to be stated that the South African business 
rescue procedure does not make provision for placing creditors into classes; that being the 
case, secured and unsecured creditors are not dealt with separately in terms of the legislation. 
While it is conceded that secured creditors are in a stronger negotiating position than 
unsecured creditors due to the quantum of their claims and the fact that they hold security 
(for instance, they have a bigger influence on the outcome when voting on the plan), the truth 
is that all the creditors, whether directly or indirectly, are liable for the payment of the BRP’s 
fees. It is not only the unsecured creditors who are liable for the fees and this is why the BRP 
argued that should a business rescue be converted to a liquidation, both secured and 
unsecured creditors should be held liable for the payment of the outstanding fees in a 
subsequent liquidation. Using the Court’s own approach in interpreting the sections, it is not 
clear how it could conclude that section 143(5) refers back to section 135. There is absolutely 
nothing in the wording of section 143 that supports this interpretation or conclusion. 
 In dealing with the question as to whether the secured creditors are also responsible 
for a portion of the BRP’s fees carried over from a business rescue proceeding, the Court 
relied on the wording of section 95(1) (read with section 89(1)) of the SA Insolvency Act 1936, 
stating that the section does not cater for the proportionate payment of the BRP’s fees by 
secured creditors.15 It is quite obvious that the relevant section does not cater for this as the 
SA Insolvency Act was drafted a long time before the business rescue provisions in the SA 
                                                          
14 [2017] ZASCA para 44: “From the sections of chapter 6 that deal with security, it is apparent that security is treated in the same 
way as it is in the law more generally. There is, in other words, no indication that, in business rescue proceedings, security is to be 
diluted or undermined in any way. For instance, s 134(3) provides that if a company wishes, during business rescue proceedings, 
to dispose of property that is held as security by another person, it may only do so with that person’s prior consent, unless  the 
proceeds of the disposal ‘would be sufficient to fully discharge the indebtedness protected by that person’s security’; and then the 
company must pay the person promptly up to the company’s indebtedness to him or her, or provide satisfactory security for that 
amount.” 
15 The costs referred to in s 89(1) include the costs of maintaining, preserving and realising the property in question, as well as 
certain fees (such as the liquidator’s fees, a proportionate share of the Master’s fees, etc.). 
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Companies Act 2008 came into operation. By the same token, the provisions of the SA 
Insolvency Act also do not make provision for the outstanding BRP’s fees to be paid as a 
preferential claim in the liquidation – ironically, it is the decision in this case that determined 
that the BRP’s fees must be paid after the costs of liquidation (i.e., as a preferential claim) and 
has created a new preference that precedes payments to other preferential creditors under 
the relevant provisions of the SA Insolvency Act 1936 (sections 98 to 101). 
 The BRP’s argument that secured creditors should also be held (proportionately) liable 
for the BRP’s outstanding fees was based on the fact that, in the business rescue 
proceedings, they would be liable on the basis that creditors are not divided into classes. All 
the creditors, to one extent or another, are liable for the BRP’s fees – this is clear from the 
plain wording of section 143(5). 
b) Date of liquidation 
The BRP also argued that the effective date of liquidation was the date on which the 
resolution for business rescue had been passed in terms of section 129, making all the costs 
incurred in the business rescue, costs of liquidation under section 97 of the SA Insolvency Act. 
In this regard the SCA held that the effective date of liquidation was the date on which the 
liquidation application was filed, which was a long time after the business rescue resolution 
had been passed. While it is submitted that in this specific case the SCA came to the correct 
conclusion regarding the date of liquidation, it needs to be borne in mind that this case dealt 
with a corporation that had entered business rescue voluntarily. The SCA did not deal with 
what the position would have been had the company already been in provisional or final 
liquidation at the time the business rescue application had been granted. In such a case the 
liquidation order will be suspended in terms of section 131(6).16 Had this been the case in this 
decision, the question arises as to what the SCA would have decided regarding the date of 
liquidation, as the date of liquidation would have preceded the business rescue proceeding 
and would merely have been suspended until the business rescue proceeding had terminated. 
Once the business rescue proceedings had ended, the liquidation proceedings would have 
revived, including the date of liquidation. Since the SCA did not deal with this scenario, the 
question remains unanswered as to whether the BRP’s arguments in this regard had any 
merit. 
c) Proof of claim 
Referring to section 44 of the SA Insolvency Act, the Court held that the business rescue 
practitioner was required to prove a formal claim in the liquidation before his claim could be 
recognised and paid, In doing so, the Court drew a distinction between pre-liquidation 
creditors and claims by persons who had rendered services in connection with the 
sequestration (liquidation) or the administration of the estate, stating that the practitioner’s 
claim did not fall into the latter category. The SCA’s statement that all pre-liquidation creditors 
are required to prove a claim in terms of section 44 is not entirely accurate; for example, in 
terms of section 98A(3) of the SA Insolvency Act, employees are not required to prove claims 
for the preferential portion of their claims. If one refers back to the previous question 
                                                          
16 Maroos and Others v GCC Engineering (Pty) Ltd [2017] JOL 38084 (GP) (901/2017) [2018] ZASCA 178 (3 December 2018) where 
the court confirmed that liquidation proceedings are suspended in their entirety, including the powers of the liquidators appointed 
in the liquidation. 
Wolverhampton Law Journal  67 
 
regarding the date of liquidation (see paragraph b) above), the question arises as to whether 
the BRP would have to have proved a claim if the business rescue had commenced after a 
liquidation order had been granted. 
IV. ADDITIONAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
In a unanimous judgment penned by Khampepe J, the South African Constitutional Court 
(CC)17 found that it was not in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal because there 
were no reasonable prospects of success that the CC would reverse or materially alter the 
decision of the SCA. The CC, therefore, dismissed the application for leave to appeal. 
a) A purposeful reading 
The CC raised some interesting, yet arguable, points regarding the interpretation of the 
provisions. Whilst conceding that the drafting of the provisions created ambiguity,18 the CC 
attempted to resolve this by utilising a purposeful reading of the provisions. It concluded that 
“…when one considers the purpose of business rescue and the overall context of the relevant 
sections, [it does] not see any basis on which to interfere with the order of the Supreme Court 
of Appeal”.19 
 This approach led the CC to consider the purpose of the Chapter 6 business rescue 
proceedings as having, as its primary goal, the avoidance of liquidation and its negative 
consequences on stakeholders and as a secondary purpose to achieve a better outcome for 
the creditors than the immediate liquidation of the corporation.20 Moreover, the CC 
emphasised that this must be done while balancing the rights of all affected persons, 
including creditors, employees and shareholders as per section 7(k) of the SA Companies Act. 
Section 7(k), however, states that the rights and interests of all relevant stakeholders should 
be balanced. 
In the CC’s opinion, the BRP’s interpretation of a ‘super-preference’ in liquidation in relation to 
his remuneration did not achieve a balance of the rights of all interested parties. The CC went 
even further, stating that the BRP’s interpretation would also affect the rights of the liquidator 
(a party outside of the rescue proceedings) who will not be able to enjoy the same priority as 
the BRP in liquidation and would even rank after the BRP.21 In our view, the court did not 
consider that a BRP should also be regarded as a relevant stakeholder who agrees to take a 
difficult and complex appointment and that he is entitled to be remunerated as such even in 
the event of a failed rescue attempt. Moreover, the CC failed to recognise that its 
interpretation and the subsequent precedent could actually contribute to the 
disenfranchisement of stakeholders in business rescue in future. The less attractive ranking 
                                                          
17 The Constitutional Court of South Africa is the highest court in the country when it comes to the interpretation, protection and 
enforcement of the Constitution. Section 167(3)(b)(ii) of the South African Constitution empowers the CC to hear matters that 
raise an arguable point of law of general public importance. [2018] ZACC 48, para 30. “I am satisfied that this matter raises an 
arguable point of law of general public importance. The correct interpretation of sections 135(4) and 143(5) of the Companies Act 
and whether these sections confer a “super preference” on practitioners will have a significant impact on credit providers, and 
therefore the public, and should be considered. I will deal below with the question of whether the application has “reasonable” 
prospects of success. First, I consider the ancillary applications in this matter.” 
18 [2018] ZACC 48, para 47. “However, there is some ambiguity.” and para 51 “Given that some ambiguity arises when 
sections135(4) and 143(5) of the Companies Act are read together, it is necessary to interpret the sections having regard to their 
purpose…”. 
19 [2018] ZACC 48, para 71. 
20 [2018] ZACC 48, para 54. 
21 [2018] ZACC 48, para 56. “The effect of the ‘super preference’ contended for is that the claim for remuneration of the 
practitioner would, in fact, rank ahead of the costs of liquidation.” 
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order for the BRP’s remuneration in liquidation created by this decision, creates a self-interest 
threat in that the BRP’s interest in the proceedings (the BRP’s remuneration) could be in 
conflict with his or her statutory duties and duties as a fiduciary, in that he or she might be 
influenced by this not to convert rescue proceedings to liquidation proceedings when it is no 
longer feasible to rescue in fear of not being paid what he or she is due in a subsequent 
liquidation. This scenario will hamper the BRP’s duty to exercise his or her powers in an 
independent and impartial manner and would most definitely not lead to a proper balancing of 
the rights and interests of other stakeholders. Lastly, we fail to see why the less beneficial 
position created for the liquidator due to the BRP’s interpretation is indicative of a lack of 
balance in the rescue regime. Surely a BRP should not be penalised for the shoddy manner in 
which the SA Companies Act has been drafted? The CC cited the following in its judgment: 
“Judges must be alert to, and guard against, the temptation to substitute what they regard as 
reasonable, sensible or businesslike for the words actually used.”22 We agree wholeheartedly 
with this statement.  
b) The corporation not being a suitable candidate for rescue and Diener’s bona fides 
A recurring theme in this case (before the court of first instance, the SCA and the CC) is 
mention of the fact that this corporation was not a suitable candidate for rescue, should not 
have been placed in business rescue in the first place and that this constituted a serious 
abuse of process by the debtor and BRP.23 In our view, this recurring theme is irrelevant in the 
determination of the issues that were before the Courts. These are considerations specific to 
this case, for which alternative statutory and common law remedies for aggrieved parties 
exist,24 and ought not to influence the underlying principles of the entire rescue regime. 
c) Comments on remuneration claimed by Diener 
 
Given the fact that the corporation only had one major creditor; one immovable property, no 
employees and only lasted two months, the BRP’s fees appear to be high,25 which probably did 
not help the BRP’s cause in this case.26  
IV Conclusion 
In our view, the judgments given by the Courts in this case show a lack of detailed 
understanding of the process of business rescue and were swayed by irrelevant 
considerations in determining the issues. Having decided that the BRP was not entitled to a 
‘super preference’, the SA Companies Act was then interpreted to fit with this finding, without 
giving due regard to the consequences of the judgments issued. 
                                                          
22 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality [2012] ZASCA 13; 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) as quoted on p 20 n 35 of 
the judgment (excerpt from quote used). 
23 The resolution to initiate business rescue was in all probability filed in order to avoid the imminent sale in execution of the 
company’s only asset. 2018] ZACC 48, para 10. “…a mere two days before the sale in execution…” and “It is common cause that at 
the time JD Bester was not conducting any business, had no employees and no assets other than the immovable property over 
which FRB held the mortgage bond.” 
24 For example, any interested party (such as the major creditor in this case) could have applied to set aside the business rescue 
resolution by the corporation under the provisions of s 130 of the Companies Act. 
25 Mr Diener’s fees amounted to ZAR 112 918.40 (approximately GBP 6 273). However, the breakdown of the BRP’s fees is not 
evident from the decision, so a proper analysis of the fees claimed cannot be made. 
26 There has been much criticism of the fees claimed by BRPs since the legislation came into effect in 2011. An additional 
problem is that no provision is made for the proper taxation of the BRPs fees in a business rescue, resulting in no oversight of the 
amounts claimed. 
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The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide states that it is desirable that an insolvency law recognises 
the importance of according priority to payment of the insolvency practitioner’s 
remuneration.27 If BRPs are not certain of payment for the performance of the tasks in relation 
to the administration of the estate, why would they agree to taking such an appointment in the 
first place? 
 
                                                          
27 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 2005: p 182, para 57. Rankings are normally based upon commercial and legal 
relationships between the debtor and its creditors but distribution policies also very often reflect choices that recognise important 
public interests (such as the protection of employment), the desirability of ensuring the orderly and effective conduct of the 
insolvency proceedings (providing priority for the remuneration of insolvency practitioners and the expenses of the insolvency 
administration) and promoting the continuation of the business and its reorganisation. It is due to this competition between the 
broader public interests and private interests that a distortion of normal commercial incentives arises. Put more plainly, it is the 
interests of the insolvency practitioner competing with the interests of the creditors that give rise to a distortion of what is normal 
practice. 
